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JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW
A generation ago, when the law schools of our state universi ties 
were fi rst founded, the dominion of law appeared to be com plete. 
Almost every phase of public and of individual activity was sub-
ject to judicial review. It was taken to be an axiom that the peo-
ple themselves were subject to certain fundamental limi tations, 
running back of all constitutions and inherent in the very nature 
of free government, and it was assumed without serious question 
that the scope and the extent of these limitations were questions 
of law. Administration was subjected to strict judicial control, 
and almost every measure of police encountered an injunction as 
a matter of course. We were proud to have achieved a govern-
ment of laws and not of men, and we looked down complacently 
upon the bureau-ridden peoples of Europe without a suspicion of 
being law-ridden ourselves. So important was the role of law in 
connection with every aspect of social and governmental activity 
that one need not wonder that in the West the state itself under-
took to provide for public instruction in law as a part of its broad 
programme of popular education.
In the interval a great change has gone forward. While the 
generation that established state universities was proud of 
the American doctrine of the judicial power over unconsti-
tutional legislation, the present generation seems eager to re-
ject the idea of a fundamental law; and proposals to transform 
con stitutionality from a question of pure law into a question of 
pure politics fi nd support even in the legal profession. Where 
the generation that founded the state universities of the West 
con ceived it a postulate of liberty that administration must be 
confi ned to the inevitable minimum and sought through judi-
cial review complete elimination of the personal equation in all 
matters aff ecting the life, liberty, or fortune of the citizen; the 
present generation is eager to unshackle administration, to take 
away judicial review of administrative action wherever possible, 
and to cut it down to the minimum where it cannot be avoid-
ed. Where yesterday we relied upon courts, to-day we rely upon 
boards and commissions. Even in criminal causes, which the 
lawyer regards, before all things, as the domain of the common 
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law, Juvenile Courts, probation commissions, and other attempts 
to individualise the treatment of off enders—these, as well as the 
desire of the medical profession to take questions of expert opin-
ion out of the forum and commit them to a sort of medical ref-
eree, bid fair to introduce an administrative element into punitive 
justice which our fathers would have abhorred. Yester day, when 
the project of state colleges of law was fi rst announced, the courts 
and the law played the chief role in the practical conduct of af-
fairs. To-day, when the execution of that project is complete, it 
might seem that there is danger that nothing of real moment will 
much longer be committed to them.
Perhaps the scoff er might say this change is the justifi cation of 
a college of law in a university. He might say that as long as the 
common-law tradition, which our fathers prized as a part of their 
inheritance, was a living force, it was for men of action, trained 
in the offi  ce and tried in the courts; but that when the march of 
events had deprived it of vitality and had fast begun to make of 
it a matter of merely historical interest, it had become something 
for the scholar and the teacher. One need not waste time in chal-
lenging the statement that an institution does not come within 
the jurisdiction of a teacher until it is dead; we may be sure that 
a state does not institute a school which it believes is to be de-
voted to a sort of social paleontology. And yet, if one looked only 
at the surface, one might not be sure that our scoff er was in the 
wrong. For while we pile up laws as never before, he would tell 
us, we rely less and less upon law. No school is needed to teach 
and to study the statutes, nor is such a school possible in a time 
when the biennial revision of two years ago is about to become 
obsolete on the fi rst of January of every odd-numbered year. If 
the will of the people, or the will of any one, as mere will, au-
thoritatively declared, is all there is of law, the law school should 
give way to the school of political science; the teacher of law 
should be put with the historian, the classical philologist, and 
the pure man of science, not with the teacher of medicine, of en-
gineering, a|id of applied science, and his study of the juristic 
theories and judicial institutions of our fathers should be reck-
oned a preparatory or cultural rather than a professional train-
ing. It is necessary only to read the pronouncements of an ad-
vanced type of teacher of government and of politics to see that 
some such notion is coming to be widely held. We may well ask, 
therefore, is the world, or at least our part of the world, about
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to give up justice according to law? Is authority to prevail over 
reason? Is jurisprudence to give way to politics? Is the judge to 
give way to the administrator and the court to be superseded by 
the judicial referendum?
If legal history may be vouched, the lawyer may respond to 
these questions confi dently. Not only has there been, from the 
very beginning of law, a continuous movement back and forth be-
tween will and reason, between rules authoritatively im posed and 
ideals developed by juristic science, between the imperative and 
the traditional elements in legal systems; but along with this os-
cillation has gone an action and reaction from justice according 
to law to justice without law and then back to an increasing num-
ber and detail of legal rules.
An instructive instance may be found in the history of Eng-
lish law. In the middle of the sixteenth century lawyers began 
to complain that the common law was being set aside. Scarce-
ly any business of importance came to the king’s courts of law. 
It was observed that the judges had little left to do but look 
about them. In all criminal causes of any political impor tance, 
an examination by two or three academically trained Roman-
ists was threatening to take the place of the machinery of the 
common law. Yet but a short time before the courts of law had 
been crowded with suitors. Indeed for three hundred years pre-
ceding the king’s courts had been assuming more and more 
a central position in the English polity. As far back as the 
reign of Edward III they had enforced the doctrine of the su-
premacy of law upon the collectors of the king’s taxes and had 
made clear to the king that he would not be suff ered to inter-
fere by private letter with the due course of justice. More re-
cently they had laid down that even Parliament could not make 
the king a parson in contravention of the fundamental distinc-
tion between spiritual and temporal authority. In Tudor Eng-
land this growth of the common law stopped for a season. For 
a time growth took place in quite another type of tribunal than 
the king’s courts of common law. For a time the courts at West-
minster were pushed into the background by tribunals of a Ro-
man, and, what was more important, a summary procedure. Th at 
was the age of the King’s Council, of the Star Chamber, of the 
Court of Requests; in short it was an age of administrative rath-
er than of judicial tribunals. Th e movement away from the com-
mon law was then, as it is to-day, a movement from judicial
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justice, administered in courts, to executive justice, administered 
in administrative tribunals or by administrative offi  cers. It was a 
reaction, as the movement to-day is a reaction, from justice ac-
cording to law to justice without law.
Moreover, the causes of the two movements away from law are 
closely analogous. In the reaction from the common law in Tu-
dor and Stuart England, the stage of equity or natural law was 
succeeding a stage of strict law. Th e law was liberalising by an in-
fusion of moral ideas from without; and since the hard and fast 
mould of common-law procedure precluded this liberalisation 
and this infusion through the ordinary course of the law, it was 
necessary to go outside of the law for a season until a readjust-
ment could be accomplished. In like manner to-day, a stage which 
European writers are calling the socialisation of law is succeeding 
a stage of maturity of law which has much in common with the 
stage of the strict law. Th e strict law is a stage of legal remedies in 
which men rely on rule and form to preclude arbi trary magisterial 
action. Th e maturity of law is a stage of legal rights in which men 
insist on equality and security and demand the highest degree of 
certainty as a means thereto. It has been said that the strict law 
was unmoral; that in its insistence upon rule and form it took no 
account of the moral aspects of conduct. In the same way it might 
be said that the maturity of law came to be unmoral in that in its 
insistence upon abstract equality and security for the maximum 
of individual self-assertion it took no account of the moral worth 
of the concrete individual. Hence an infusion of ideas from with-
out has come to be necessary, as before, and such an infusion has 
been going on through the absorption of ideas developed in the 
social sciences. But again, as before, the hard and fast mould of a 
legal system such as was demanded by the social interests in secu-
rity of acquisitions and security of transactions—the paramount 
social interests in the maturity of law—has made it necessary to 
go outside of the law for a season and to rely upon administrative 
agencies until new bodies of law shall arise through which jus-
tice may be attained. We may well compare the courts developed 
in and for feudal Eng land, struggling to meet the wants of Eng-
land of the Reformation by a feudal property law, with American 
courts, developed in and for the pioneer or agricultural communi-
ties of the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, straggling to meet 
the wants of to-day with the rules and the machinery devised for 
such communities.
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Nor are these isolated phenomena. Th e great liberalising 
agency in law which we call equity has always begun as execu-
tive justice. Th e Roman prætor interposed by virtue of his im-
perium to do what could not be done through the ius strictum. 
Later the Roman emperor enforced testamentary trusts because, 
so the Institutes tell us, he “was moved several times by favour 
of particular persons.” Th e Frankish King was wont to decide, 
not according to law but secundum æquitatem, for those whom 
he had taken under his special protection. Th e English chan-
cellor, at fi rst, was not appealed to for relief which the com-
plainant sought as of right, but out of “alms and charitie.” In 
all these cases the magistrate acted without rule in accordance 
with general notions of fair play and sympathy for a wronged 
or a weaker party. Th e executive justice of to-day is essential-
ly of the same nature. It is an attempt to adjust the relations of 
individ uals with each other and with the state summarily, large-
ly according to the notions of an administrative offi  cer for the 
time being as to what the general interest and “a square deal” 
de mand, unencumbered by many rules. Th e fact that it is large-
ly justice without law is what commends it now to a restless 
age, desirous of results at whatever cost, as it was what com-
mended it once to the individualism of an England set to think-
ing freely and vigorously by Renaissance and Reformation. In 
each case the cause of the movement away from the law is the 
same. In each of the partial reversions to justice without law re-
ferred to, it has happened that for the time being the law was 
not fulfi lling its end. It was not adjusting the relations of indi-
viduals with each other so as to accord with the moral sense of 
the com munity. Hence prætor or emperor or king or chancel-
lor admin istered justice for a time without law till a new and 
more liberal system of rules developed. Indeed, these reversions 
to justice without law mark the rise of new ideas of justice—
in antiquity, the transition from the idea of law as a mere de-
vice to keep the peace to the idea of law as a means of pre-
serving the social status quo; in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, a transition from the classical idea of preserving the 
social status quo to the idea of a maximum of individual self-as-
sertion. To-day a like transition is in progress.  Th e world over, 
a shifting of ideas as to the end of the law and the meaning of 
justice is putting a heavy pressure upon the administration of 
jus tice according to law; and the world over the public is dis-
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satisfi ed with the lawyer and the refl ecting lawyer is dissatisfi ed 
with himself.
None of the reversions to justice without law to which refer-
ence has been made resulted in any permanent encroachment 
upon the control of principle and reason in the administration of 
justice. Th e exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the proctor came 
to be governed by a stereotyped edict and its provisions passed 
into the law. It is true Coke lost in his quarrel with the Court of 
Chancery. But the other Romanised courts perished and Chan-
cery was made over gradually along common-law lines. Th e eq-
uity made in the Court of Chancery and the law as to misde-
meanours made in the Star Chamber became parts of the legal 
system and were transplanted to this country as parts of the com-
mon law. Th e common law survived and the sole perma nent re-
sult of the reversion to justice without law was a liberalis ing and 
modernising of the law.
If we meet the movement away from law, therefore, by a mod-
ernising of the legal and judicial machinery which will enable 
it to meet more eff ectively the demands of the present, to at-
tain the ends for which the legal system exists, we may be con-
fi dent that now, as in Tudor and Stuart England, the law will 
prevail. For executive justice is an evil, even if some times a nec-
essary evil. It has always been, and in the long run it always will 
be, crude and as variable as the personalities of offi  cials. No one 
can long be suff ered to wield the royal power of deciding with-
out rule according to convictions of right but one trained to 
subordinate impulse and will to reason, disciplined in the exer-
cise of reason and experienced in the diffi  cult art of determin-
ing controversies. If we did not know it, legal history could 
teach us that no one may be trusted to dispense with rules but 
one who knows the rules thoroughly and knows how to ap-
ply them on occasion. Hence time has always imposed a legal 
yoke upon executive justice and has turned administrative tribu-
nals into ordinary courts. A law-ridden people, fi nding that in 
an age which demands positive action the legal system furnish-
es only checks and safeguards, may for a time throw over justice 
accord ing to law and seek relief outside of law. But the experience 
of the past makes it clear that if we improve the output of judi-
cial justice till the adjustment of human relations by our courts 
is brought into better accord with the moral sense of the pub-
lic at large and is achieved without unreasonable not to say pro-
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hibitive delay and expense, the onward march of executive justice 
will soon cease.
Not only have periods of growth been marked by a change 
in the conception of justice, an infusion of ideas into the legal 
system from without, and a rejection of law and of judicial jus-
tice in order to experiment with magisterial authority and exec-
utive justice, but such periods have been characterised in politics 
by absolute ideas of law as a product of human will, followed 
in jurisprudence by a revival of idealism and a renewed insis-
tence upon reason and justice. Both of these phenomena may 
be observed to-day. In the seventeenth century it was progres-
sive to insist upon the royal prerogative. Th ose who thought of 
the king as the guardian of social interests and wished to give 
him arbitrary power that he might use it benevolently in the 
general interest, were enraged to see the sovereign tied down 
by anti quated legal bonds discovered by lawyers in such musty 
and dusty parchments as Magna Carta. To them the will of the 
sovereign was the criterion of law, and it was the duty of the 
courts, whenever the royal will for the time being and for the 
cause in hand was ascertained, to be governed accordingly. In-
deed, in the preceding century the protestant jurist-theolo gians 
of the Reformation held to the political doctrine of passive obe-
dience and vigorously denounced the rebellious peasants. Yet at 
the very time a new philosophical development was at hand in 
jurisprudence, as a result of which the imperative element in law 
was long to be forgotten and a conception of law as de riving au-
thority solely from its inherent reason and justice was to hold 
the fi eld for two centuries. To-day, political thought is full of 
absolute ideas of law as the will of the people. Th ose who think 
of pluralities and militant minorities as the guardians of social 
interests and would give them arbitrary powers that they may 
use them benevolently in the general interest, are enraged to see 
the sovereign tied down by dead precedents and anti quated le-
gal bonds discovered by lawyers in eighteenth-century bills 
of rights. Once more it is asserted that the will of the sover-
eign, even for the time being and for the cause in hand, must 
be both the ultimate guide and the immediate source to which 
judges shall refer. Nevertheless as before, while absolute views 
of the sort are current in political thinking, a return to juridical 
idealism is at hand. Already jurists of Continental Europe are 
once more writing elaborate treatises on natural law. A revival
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of philosophical jurisprudence in the United States has defi nitely 
begun and conscious attempt to make the law conform to ideals 
is once more becoming the creed of jurisprudence.
Th is does not mean that jurists are going back to the eigh-
teenth-century conception of a set of fundamental legal prin-
ci-ples of universal validity for all men, in all places, in all times, 
from which a complete set of rules might be drawn by purely 
logical processes. Th ey are content to search for the ideals of the 
age and to set them up as a guide. Th ey are content to seek what 
Kohler calls the jural postulates of the civilisation of the time. But 
they are not content to abdicate all function and to concede that 
court and lawyer have no more to do than to ascer tain and inter-
pret the will of the majority or plurality for the time being. Th e 
notion of juristic superfl uity involved in such a doc trine is as im-
possible in the complex industrial society of to-day as the notion 
of legislative futility, held so generally during the hegemony of the 
historical school or the notion of juristic futility added thereto by 
the positivists. Men are not born with intui tions of the principles 
by which justice may be attained through the public adjudication 
of controversies. Th e administration of justice is not an easy task 
to which every man is competent. It is no more possible for the 
people to administer justice directly or to control the course of 
justice directly than it is for them to administer medicine or con-
trol the course of medical science directly or to direct armies and 
con trol the course of military science. In each case study of the 
experience of the past joined with scientifi c understanding of the 
problems involved is the road to the ends sought, and a technical 
body of knowledge inevitably results which may be mastered only 
through special study and training. Th is is the meaning of Coke’s 
famous answer to James I. When the King said, “Have I not rea-
son as well as my judges?” as the people say to-day, “Have we not 
reason as well as our courts ?” Coke responded:
“True it was that God had endowed his majesty with excellent science 
and great endowments of nature; but his majesty was not learned in the 
laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life or inherit-
ance of goods or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural 
[i. e. by untrained] reason, but by the artifi cial [i. e. the trained] reason and 
judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experi-
ence before that a man can attain to the cognisance of it.”
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Every attempt to go back to justice without law has enforced 
the lesson which the judges of England taught King James in 
that memorable Sunday conference. In this country we should 
have learned it when in the period after the Revolution the bitter 
hostility to lawyers and the at tempt ruthlessly to break down the 
professional tradition, to insure the access of the untrained and 
incompetent to the oppor tunities of the bar, and to degrade the 
judicial offi  ce, resulted only in establishing the lawyer as the lead-
er of the community and in intrenching the fundamental dogmas 
of the common law in our constitutions. Indeed, much of which 
we are now complaining so justly is not in any wise to be attrib-
uted to something inherent in law or in the common law or in 
lawyers or in judges. It is largely due to the untrained and unor-
ganised bar and mediocre, politics-ridden bench forced upon so 
many of our jurisdictions by popular suspicion and false notions 
of democracy in the last century.
We may be assured, therefore, that justice according to law is 
not to disappear. We may be confi dent that we shall have, not 
merely laws, expressions of the popular will for the time being, 
but law, an expression of reason applied to the relations of man 
with man and of man with the state. We may well believe also 
that a new period of legal development is at hand and that, as 
in like periods in legal history, it will be a period of working 
over the jural materials of the past and working into them new 
ideas from without. We shall be warranted in prophesying that 
this working over will be eff ected by means of a philosophical 
theory of right and justice and a conscious attempt to make the 
law conform to ideals. Such a period will be a period of scien-
tifi c law-making by lawyers trained in the universities. For the 
notion of law as the will of the people belongs to the past era 
of a complete and stable system in which certainty and secu-
rity were the sole ends. Th roughout legal history law has been 
stagnant whenever the imperative idea has been uppermost. 
Law has lived and grown through juristic activity. It has been 
liberalised by ideas of natural right or justice or reasonable-
ness or utility, leading to criteria by which rules and principles 
and standards might be tested, not by ideas of force and com-
mand and the sovereign will as the ultimate source of authori-
ty.  To-day the most signifi cant changes in our law are not those 
which have been proceeding with much fl ourish of trumpets
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through legislative experiment, but those which have been go-
ing on silently beneath the surface in our case law and have been 
quietly and gradually but surely bringing the traditional element 
of the legal system into accord with a newer conception of jus-
tice. Along with this a no less signifi cant change has gone for-
ward in legal thinking. It has been seen that the old controversies 
as to the nature of law were barren. Hence the social philosophi-
cal Jurists, who have created a new science of law in the univer-
sities of Continental Europe, have abandoned that question and 
have gone behind it to defi ne the legal order in which law results 
and for which it exists. Th e means of attaining this legal order, 
or, as we should put it, the means of administering justice, may 
vary. Th e agencies which determine the content of the body of 
principles by which it is regulated may be this or that. Th ey may 
be command and sovereign will, or reason and juristic science, or 
custom and tradition. But the end has been before men from the 
beginning of legal evolution. By appealing from the particular 
form of law which is now current to the ultimate conception of 
the legal order, the new school points out the road for future de-
velopment in jurisprudence. It keeps before us that law is not an 
end but a means. And this functional conception of law gives a 
new meaning and a new value to the juristic ideals of reason and 
justice which have been our main reliance in all periods of growth 
in the past. But this study of law as a means, this measuring of it 
with reference to the end, this study of the actual social eff ects of 
legal institutions and legal doctrines, this study of the means of 
making legal rules eff ective for the ends to be reached, can go on 
only in the universities.
In the making over of our common law which is about to take 
place we may no longer rely upon the formulating agencies which 
have served in Anglo-American law in the past. Th ere is no com-
mon legislative authority set over all common-law juris dictions 
nor is there likely to be one. Th e conditions of legis lative law-
making to-day and even more those of direct popular law-mak-
ing are not such as to warrant belief that legislation upon purely 
legal subjects may do more than add sanction to what proceeds 
from some other source. Again, there is no com mon reviewing 
tribunal set over all common-law jurisdictions, nor is the world 
likely to see one, at least in any period we can foresee. Th ere are 
no signs that the Bench in America is likely to regain the po-
sition requisite for purely judicial development of the common
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law. If nothing else, stress of business in the modem industrial 
and urban community makes it unlikely that American courts 
will much longer be able to do more than give authoritative form 
to what has been worked out and formulated by others. Indeed, 
we see such a condition to-day. Who would contend that ei-
ther legislation or judicial decision, with no stimulus from with-
out, could ever have done for our law of evidence what has been 
done by Th ayer and Wigmore? As our jurists give over the pure-
ly historical method, which has governed exclusively in the past, 
as effi  cacy of eff ort, already part of the social and political creed, 
becomes part of the juristic creed, a new mode of develop ing le-
gal principles is aff orded by academic teaching. For the teach-
er of law is coming to work in the conditions of permanence 
and independence that were the strength of the common-law 
judge. He is in the position to do historical, critical, and analyti-
cal work that would be impossible, even if in place, in a modem 
judicial opinion. Moreover, he may deal with the law and with 
departments of the law as a whole, while a court must look at 
each piecemeal.
In providing colleges of law, accordingly, the state is ensuring 
that development of the legal system of the commonwealth and 
is assuming its part in that development of the legal system of 
English-speaking peoples which will give law a new life. But it 
is doing more. No form of conservation is more important than 
the conservation of social institutions. And no social insti tution 
is of more value than the legal tradition, the tradition of justice 
according to law, upon which generations of lawyers and judg-
es have wrought in England and America. In the volumes of re-
ports in which the common law is set forth we have a body of 
experience in the administration of justice which is without par-
allel in any other system. However law is to be made, wheth-
er by jurist or judge or legislator, this traditional material can-
not be neglected. Th e reports, says Judge Dillon, “are capable 
of being made quite as valuable to the legislator as to the law-
yer, since the uninterrupted light of experience of many genera-
tions of men shines forth from them to mark out and illumine 
the leg islator’s pathway. He need scarcely take a single step in the 
dark.” No one, however, may hope to use this tradition as the ba-
sis of a new body of law but one who has mastered it. Looked 
at simply as a body of rules, our Anglo-American law is at its 
worst. It is not as an abstract system or as a body of rules that
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the common law has imposed itself upon a French code in Lou-
isiana and in Quebec. It is not as a body of rules that it has all 
but overcome a received Roman law in Scotland, that it is invad-
ing the Roman-Dutch law of South Africa, or that it is creating 
a system Anglo-American in substance, if Roman-Spanish in its 
terms, in the Philippines and in Porto Rico. It is not as a body of 
rules that our common law of torts is coming to be a law of the 
world as truly as the Roman law-of contracts. Th e conventional 
method of comparative legislation, the mere comparison of rules, 
and the attempt to choose from among them according to their 
abstract justice or their a priori fi tness for the end sought, was 
long ago likened by Savigny to the frame of mind of the child 
who, when the history of battles was related to him, asked which 
side was the good and which the bad. It is not enough to compare 
rules as abstract rules. Th e greatest value of our huge body of re-
ports is that rightly studied it enables the lawyer to perceive how 
far rules have been able to maintain themselves in their practical 
application and to gain some in sight into their eff ect when ap-
plied to new situations. Th e Roman imperial lawmaker gave au-
thority to constitutions and rescripts prepared by the juriscon-
sult who had mastered the Roman juristic tradition but measured 
every detail by his theory of natural law.  Th e American popular 
lawmaker will leave no permanent mark upon the law unless in 
like manner he is guided by the lawyer who has mastered the An-
glo-American tradition, but has learned to measure every detail 
with reference to the social sciences of to-day. If the legal tradi-
tion is not self-suffi  cient, neither are the social sciences self-suf-
fi cient in the administration of justice. Th e principles are empty 
except as content is given them by judicial empiricism or juristic 
adjust ment to the materials of the past.
Th e most signifi cant feature of twentieth century thought is 
faith in the effi  cacy of conscious social eff ort and of intelligent-
ly directed social control. For it is not physical nature alone that 
may be harnessed to man’s use. Th e laws by which mind com bines 
its work-with mind and with the non-sentient factors of hu-
man conditions are no less a part of nature and are no less to be 
learned and put to use. Not the least part of these laws consists 
of those determining the standards of conduct in the relations 
of man with man and of man with society which will advance 
civilisation and will make for the best and noblest society. And
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the administration of justice as far as reason and principle may 
insure conformity to such standards, not arbitrarily or in the con-
scious interest of any man or any class—this is the justice accord-
ing to law of our Germanic, our Anglo-American tradition, the 
sighing of the creature for the justice and truth of his creator, 
which marked the German law of the Middle Ages, the rule of 
the king under God, and the law of which Bracton spoke, and 
the fundamental law running back of all states and constitutions 
which our fathers sought to express in bills of rights.
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